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Abstract: The monetary economy has properties that cannot be analyzed using the tools of 
today's dynamic general equilibrium analysis. Keynes's economics, far from being an aberration 
in the otherwise orderly evolution of modern macroeconomics from Adam Smith's ideas about 
the "invisible hand", was a major contribution to an ongoing tradition in monetary theory in 
whose creation Smith himself had played a part. Retrospective consideration of this tradition 
suggests that the property of the monetary economy critical to the generation of economic crises 
and the stagnation that follows them is its capacity to permit trading at "false" prices, a 
phenomenon ruled out by assumption in dynamic general equilibrium models. Not only Keynes's 
explanation of depression but also Hayek and Robertson's analysis of the role of unsustainable 
forced saving in the boom can be thought of as relying on this factor. 
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Stability and Instability in the Market Economy 
A revival of the age-old debate about the inherent stability or otherwise of a decentralized 
economic system based on private property and voluntary exchange – a market economy as it is 
usually called – has been one of the very few positive consequences of the economic crisis that 
began in the summer of 2007.  
For three decades now, the prevailing tendency among mainstream economists, 
particularly in North America and even more particularly among those concerned with analyzing 
monetary policy issues, has been to take the capacity of such an economy to maintain continuous 
co-ordination of the maximizing choices of agents at all times as an axiomatic starting point for 
theorizing, rather than as a matter worthy of investigation in its own right. This was a logically 
necessary implication of elevating dynamic general equilibrium modeling methods deriving from 
the essentially Walrasian microeconomics of Arrow and Debreu to the status of the best, perhaps 
indeed the only acceptable, professional practice.1 While the "Great Moderation" in much of the 
world economy persisted, the fact, noted by Lucas (2004), that this approach could be of no help 
in understanding the episodes of instability that had so often arisen in earlier times and/or in far-
off places, did not seem to matter very much. The study and explanation of such events was left 
to economic historians such as, for example, Charles Kindleberger (1978, 5th ed. 2005) whose 
work retained a marginal foothold in some versions of the standard graduate syllabus, and 
perhaps also to historians of macroeconomic thought, for example Don Patinkin (1982), or 
outright heretics such as Hyman Minsky (1982), whose work by and large did not. 
Economic instability has now struck much too close to home for all this to be any longer 
acceptable, and in this lecture, I shall explore some of the things that an analysis of the monetary 
economy grounded in the historical literature dealing with such issues might have to say about 
these and similar events. I shall do so, not with the intention of instructing my fellow historians, 
for they know all about these matters already, but in the hope that practitioners of today's 
monetary economics will take some notice. 
 
This Paper's Themes 
This paper's themes are easily summarized. First, a monetary economy has long been understood 
by those who have studied it to have properties that cannot be analyzed using the tools of Arrow-
Debreu style equilibrium modeling, and Keynes's economics, far from being an aberration in an 
orderly progress from Adam Smith to today's macroeconomic orthodoxy, was part of a long 
tradition that addressed these issues, and to which Smith himself had contributed; second, a 
critical property of a monetary economy is its proclivity to permit trading to take place at prices 
that do not keep markets cleared, false prices as they are usually termed; and third, an 
understanding of economic crises such as we have recently experienced should be sought in this 
proclivity, which encompasses not only the economics of depression found in the General 
                                                          
1 Robert E. Lucas Jr. (2004) discusses the rise of these methods, which are the basis of work commonly labeled "New-
Keynesian" as well as "New-Classical". Beyond doubt, they have produced much interesting analysis, some of which has been of 
practical policy significance as well. Consider, for example, Michael Woodford (2003).  But as I have argued at some length in 
an earlier paper (Laidler 2010), they have also been intellectually limiting.  However, I did not intend then, or now, to issue any 
blanket indictment of modern monetary theory. Non-Walrasian approaches to the analysis of the monetary economy that build 
on the pioneering work of Kiyotaki and Wright.(1989) and Kocherlakota (1998) among others have not yet, to the best of my 
knowledge, developed to the point having any influence on the analysis of monetary policy, but they may well end up providing 
a micro-theoretic basis for some of the older ideas about the properties of a monetary economy canvassed in this paper that do at 
least permit these and related issues to be discussed.   
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Theory, and interpreted by later commentators such as Don Patinkin (1957) Robert Clower 
(1965) and Axel Leijonhufvud (1968), but also that of the boom as a process of  "forced saving" 
developed by economists such as the so-called "Austrians" Friedrich von Hayek (1933) and 
Lionel Robbins (1934), but also by Keynes's sometime student, collaborator and, eventual critic, 
Dennis Robertson (1926, 1928) among others. 
 
Misconceptions about the History of Macroeconomics 
The last two years have already seen a lively debate about the desirability of giving up today's 
dominant approach to macroeconomics and returning to so-called old-Keynesian economics.2  
This debate has been profoundly unsatisfactory. Though its protagonists have found much to 
disagree about concerning the relative merits of old-Keynesian and modern economics, they 
have nevertheless shared a common but misconceived view of the places of these competing 
doctrines in the development of economic thought. 
 
Keynes's Place in the Story 
At the risk of over-simplifying for the sake of brevity, this common view can be summarized as 
follows. First, modern dynamic general equilibrium analysis is the outcome of the orderly and 
systematic elaboration over almost two and a half centuries of Adam Smith's ideas, as set out in 
The Wealth of Nations, about how the pursuit of individual self-interest in competitive markets 
leads, as if by the workings of an "invisible hand", to a coherent and stable outcome at the level 
of the economy as a whole which is characterized by the full employment and efficient use of all 
available productive resources. Second, John Maynard Keynes's (1936) General Theory of 
Employment Interest and Money, inspired by the economic turbulence of the inter- war years, 
presented a radically alternative point of view, that for a while, but only a while, became the 
basis of a new economic orthodoxy that was both skeptical of the inherent stability of a largely 
unregulated economy and hence provided justification for more or less continuous activist 
policies designed to keep it on track. 
Robert E. Lucas Jr. (e.g. 1996, 2004, 2009), Paul Krugman (e.g. 2009), George Akerlof 
and Robert Schiller (e.g.2009), to name a few of the most distinguished contributors to recent 
debates have all assented to versions of this account of the history of macroeconomic thought 
and Keynes's place in it. What they have disagreed about is its significance. For Lucas, the first 
rise of old-Keynesian economics amounted to a temporary triumph of politics over economics 
and its fall from grace represented a return of the discipline to a previously dominant and 
scientifically progressive path on which it now ought to remain. For the old-Keynesians, those 
same developments represented an attempt to revolutionize the subject for the better that 
regrettably failed, but which, in the light of recent events, might turn out to have suffered more 
of a temporary set-back than a decisive defeat.  
In earlier work, for example Laidler (1999), I have argued that this view of Keynes's 
place in the development of macroeconomics is thoroughly misconceived, and in a more recent 
paper (Laidler 2010) I have suggested that the fundamental problem with modern 
macroeconomic modeling from the outset has been that it leaves no room for phenomena 
stemming from the fact of monetary exchange to be analyzed, that its inability to deal with 
                                                          
2 I use this designation in order to distinguish what might otherwise have been called just "Keynesian" economics 
from the so-called "New-Keynesian" version of dynamic general equilibrium modeling, with which it has almost 
nothing in common. 
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financial crises is therefore inherent in its very structure, and that a "business as usual" approach 
to its further development is unlikely to produce satisfactory results. I have also re-iterated the 
view, developed at length in (1999) , that overblown though Keynes's own claims about the 
revolutionary nature of his work might have been, his demonstration of how the distinctive 
nature of an economy based on monetary exchange can lead to lapses from full-employment 
makes the General Theory a work of lasting scientific importance. But I have nevertheless 
resisted the temptation to join today's old-Keynesians in claiming oracular status for that work in 
the context of today's troubles.  
 
Limitations of old-Keynesian Economics  
Original though the General Theory's specific analysis of the emergence of unemployment in a 
monetary economy is, this phenomenon is only one among several associated with the recent 
economic crisis – not to mention its many predecessors – that needs explaining. Furthermore, 
analysis of the distinctive properties of the monetary economy already had two centuries of 
history behind it before Keynes himself took it up, and that history continued vigorously into the 
1970s before the rise of Arrow-Debreu based macro-modeling came close to cutting it off. Such 
analysis had many helpful things to say about economic crises that are not to be found in the 
General Theory, so instead of returning to a specifically "old-Keynesian" economics in response 
to the events of the last three years, it might be more useful to revive the tradition of monetary 
analysis to which that economics was but one, albeit important contribution. This tradition has 
very little to do with modern myths about how today's dominant approach to macroeconomics 
evolved from Adam Smith's ruminations about the workings of the "invisible hand" by way of 
Walras and Arrow-Debreu. 
 
The Monetary Economy 
As the commonly used phrase has it, ours is a market economy, whose most fundamental 
characteristic is the generation and distribution of wealth, not just by the production of goods 
and services, but crucially by their voluntary exchange. Just as fundamental is the fact that the 
voluntary exchange in question is usually indirect and mediated through a monetary and 
financial system.3 
 
Today's Monetary System 
To resort to a homely example, in today's economy, auto-workers do not barter hours of work for 
SUVs and hybrids, which they simultaneously swap for food and clothing at the mall and offer 
as mortgage payments or retirement account contributions to the bank, insurance company or 
other institution. Though this scenario does, on a fundamental level, characterize the ultimate 
nature of the exchanges that take place in a market economy, the transactions by which these are 
realized are very different. Auto-workers are paid wages in money, which their employers obtain 
by selling cars (or by borrowing in anticipation of such sales), and at the mall they buy goods 
and services with that money (or perhaps on credit which they will later pay off by a transfer of 
money to the lender), and they make money payments to meet interest obligations on their 
                                                          
3 As David Andalfatto has reminded me, this is also the starting point for modern search theoretic approaches to the 
analysis of money, which is why (fn. 1) above, I explicitly exempt this work from my criticism of modern macro-
theory. The reader should also note that an earlier draft of the next few paragraphs first appeared in Laidler (2006) 
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mortgage debt and to reduce its principle, and perhaps to increase their retirement account 
balances as well. 
The monetary system’s most primitive task, still much discussed in the textbooks, is thus 
to provide a common means of exchange which also serves as a unit of account in which prices 
are stated, so that goods and services may be traded in spot markets. In today's economy, 
however, such trading is intertwined with transactions involving the passage of time. The 
transfer of deposit liabilities of financial institutions that typically consummates spot transactions  
- government issued currency is merely small change, and privately issued currency a rarity – 
and the once sharp distinctions among immediately chequable accounts and those meant to hold 
savings have long since been eroded. There is, therefore, no clear-cut line between those 
instruments used as means of exchange in current transactions and those representing financial 
claims on the future. Moreover, though agents who save are, on some abstract level, trading with 
themselves over time, exchanging current against future consumption; the transactions through 
which this trade is realized typically involve the transfer by them of money that could have been 
used to buy consumption goods in the present to some other agent in exchange for a claim on 
money at some time in the future. Current and planned future transactions are thus inextricably 
linked when saving decisions are executed, as they are on the other side of the same transactions 
as investors use borrowed money in the present to buy resources that are to be used to produce 
goods for sale in the future. 
Agents who are continuously engaged in monetary exchange find it convenient to hold 
inventories of the means whereby the relevant transactions are mediated. Even transactions 
whose timing is regular and predictable require them to have money on hand when they occur; 
this is the basis of what the textbooks call the "transactions" demand for money. Because the 
timing and even scale of much market activity is uncertain, however, agents also hold 
"precautionary" balances. Furthermore, whatever serves as money must be rather durable, so it 
can also be held as a store of value pure and simple, and in this latter role it becomes a substitute 
for other liabilities emitted by the financial system that do not themselves serve as a means of 
payment in spot markets, but which can be exchanged for money, more or less easily, depending 
upon the nature of the asset itself, and/or upon the depth and efficiency of the markets in which 
they can be traded. This "asset" demand for money varies with the rates of return available on 
those other assets, and individual agents' decisions about how they manage their inventories of 
money are thus, as Keynes (1930, 1936) stressed, inter-dependent with their plans for the 
allocation of consumption and production over time.4  
Enabling agents to cope with the passage of time and uncertainty about the future are 
central functions of the monetary system. Different agents have different attitudes towards risk, 
different capacities for assessing it, for valuing it, and so on, and because it is the monetary 
system that co-ordinates those agents’ activities, it is also through its workings that they seek to 
overcome what Keynes called “the dark forces of time and ignorance” in whatever ways they 
deem best for themselves. Today's monetary system provides myriad possibilities, direct and 
indirect, for linking consumers with producers, savers with investors, and for coordinating their 
plans, and it is continuously evolving new means of dealing with these matters. 
                                                          
4 I deliberately refrain from using Keynes's label "speculative demand" here, because it refers to a particular way of 
analyzing the demand for money as an asset - a store of value – rather than to the general phenomenon of what 
Keynes called "liquidity preference". 
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It is well understood that, if a market economy is to work as if guided by an “invisible 
hand” to ensure that the actions of self-interested individuals lead to desirable social outcomes, 
the information and incentives embedded in the prices facing those individuals must reflect the 
real social costs and benefits of their actions. That information and those incentives, however, 
are transmitted through the monetary system, and their communication through prices stated in 
terms of money has often and aptly been compared to the communication of ideas by way of a 
common language. Just as ambiguity, not to mention deliberate deception, in the use of language 
are always potential sources of trouble, so too are misleading messages about the present and 
unreliable promises about the future, delivered by money prices. 
 
The Monetary Fingers of Smith's Invisible Hand 
Now there is nothing that a well trained economics undergraduate would find startling or new in 
the last few paragraphs, but it is worth pointing out explicitly that none of the phenomena which 
they describe have explicitly featured – at least until very recently – in those modern dynamic 
general equilibrium models of the economy in terms of which monetary policy issues have been 
analyzed. Those models begin with the assumption that agents will always be able to complete 
their planned transactions because the prices they face are always kept at a market clearing level 
"as if" by the operations of an entity to whom Lucas (2004) has referred to as a "very fast 
auctioneer", and they also evade the awkward issues raised by Keynes's above-mentioned "dark 
forces" by attributing "rational" expectations to those same agents, views of the future based on a 
correct understanding of the economy's structure as well as their place in it, and informed by 
accurate and (up to a certain level) complete information of the nature of the shocks that might 
impinge upon it.  
As I have remarked elsewhere (e.g. Laidler 2010), the "as if" auctioneer-supervised 
"market" whose mechanisms co-ordinate these model economies is thus a metaphor for the 
actual economy's monetary system and, because its mechanisms are presumed always to work, 
these models can neither help us understand why real world monetary systems sometimes break 
down, or what might then happen as a consequence. Or to return to, and extend, Smith's much 
more famous metaphor, the invisible hand that guides the market economy has monetary fingers, 
and when these fail to function properly, so does the market economy.  
Adam Smith himself knew full well that the mechanisms of voluntary exchange over 
which the "invisible hand" presided depended on a monetary system.5 The famous chapter 3 of 
Book 1 of the Wealth of Nations (Smith 1776), "That the Division of Labour is Limited by the 
Extent of the Market" is immediately followed by Chapter 4, "Of the Origin and Use of Money", 
whose theme he summarized as follows ". . . money has become in all civilized nations the 
universal instrument of commerce, by the intervention of which goods of all kinds are bought 
and sold, or exchanged for one another" (p.44). The similarity between Smith's message here and 
that set out above about the role of money is entirely un-coincidental, and he had much else to 
say that is of direct relevance to this lecture. In particular, and more enthusiastically than his 
friend David Hume, Smith was a supporter of his native Scotland's then recently developed 
system of commercial banking with its overdraft system for financing business, and in particular 
of the replacement of gold and silver coin by the paper money that the country's note-issuing 
banks emitted. But though enthusiastic about these institutional innovations, he was not 
uncritical: 
                                                          
5 I have discussed all this in some detail in "Adam Smith as a Monetary Economist" (Laidler 2004, Ch. 1) 
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 "The gold and silver money which circulates in any country may very properly be 
compared to a highway, which, while it circulates and carries to market all the grass and 
corn of the country, produces itself not a single pile of either. The judicious operations of 
banking, by providing, if I may be allowed so violent a metaphor, a sort of waggon-way 
through the air; enable the country to convert, as it were, a great part of its highways into 
good pastures and corn fields, and thereby to increase very considerably the annual 
produce of its land and labour. The commerce and industry of the country, however, it 
must be acknowledged, though they may be somewhat augmented, cannot be altogether 
so secure, when they are thus, as it were, suspended upon the Daedalian wings of paper 
money, as when they travel about upon the solid ground of gold and silver. Over and 
above the accidents to which they are exposed from the unskilfulness of the conductors 
of this paper money, they are liable to several others, from which no prudence or skill of 
those conductors can guard them"  (p. 321) 
 
Or to put it more succinctly: it was Adam Smith's carefully considered view that 
monetary exchange is essential to the workings of a market economy and that to base it on paper 
money issued by banks in the course of granting credit to the business community, though 
extremely productive, is risky, not only because bankers sometimes make mistakes, but also 
because the banking system is subject to shocks originating elsewhere whose impact they can do 
nothing to avoid. Not surprisingly, in the light of these views, banking was one of those areas of 
economic activity that Smith thought might benefit from a little state regulation, which he 
defended in the following terms.6  
 
 "Such regulations may, no doubt, be considered as in some respects a violation of natural 
liberty. But these exertions of the natural liberty of a few individuals, which might 
endanger the security of the whole society, are, and ought to be, restrained by the laws of 
all governments; of the most free as well as the most despotical. The obligation of 
building party walls, in order to prevent the communication of fire, is a violation of 
natural liberty, exactly of the same kind with the regulations of the banking trade which 
are here proposed." (p.324) 
 
The fears of the contagion inherent in financial instability that are so apparent in this passage 
surely reflect the fact that Smith knew something of what had happened earlier in the eighteenth 
century with the Mississippi and South Sea bubbles, and closer to home, a great deal about the 
economic disruptions in Scotland associated with the collapse of the Ayr Bank in 1772.  
 
Smith's overall intellectual authority as an economist ensured that his successors would 
take notice of his views on the essential role played by the monetary system in the market 
economy, on that system's inherent fragility, not to mention on the possibility of strengthening it 
by suitable designed government intervention. These basic themes have been central to monetary 
economics since the 18th century, though of course the subsequent variations worked on them by 
Smith's successors were anything but homogeneous and often differed widely from his. Even so, 
                                                          
6 Specifically, he advocated  (1776, pp.322-329) that convertibility of their paper liabilities on demand into specie 
be legally required of bankers, and that their note issue be limited to denominations high enough to ensure that they 
circulated only among members of a financially sophisticated business community.   
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there is at least as much in the Wealth of Nations to link Smith to old- Keynesian economics as 
there is to link him to Arrow and Debreu and thence to modern equilibrium modeling, and 
today's prevailing views of what the subsequent development of economic analysis owed to him 
are misleadingly simplistic. 
 
Selected Lessons from the Subsequent History of Monetary Economics  
This is not the place for a systematic account of the evolution of Classical monetary economics 
after 1776. Suffice it to note that the British financial crises associated with the outbreak of the 
French Wars in 1793 and an invasion scare in 1797 gave a major boost to the subject's 
development, and that as the nineteenth century proceeded, it became successively evident, first 
that such crises recurred rather regularly, and, a little later, that they were in fact but one, albeit 
conspicuous, feature of a repeating sequence of events that, in the twentieth century, eventually 
came to be called  "the business cycle".7  
 
The Overstone Cycle of Trade 
As early as 1837 the banker and politician Samuel Jones-Loyd, later Lord Overstone, pointed out 
that "the state of trade revolves apparently in an established cycle. First we find it in a state of 
quiescence – next, improvement- growing confidence – prosperity – excitement – overtrading – 
convulsion – pressure – stagnation – distress – ending again in quiescence", and at some time in 
the late 1850s, his characterization of economic activity as following an ever repeating pattern 
(with slightly modified and simplified semantics) was sufficiently widely known and accepted to 
be the subject of the anonymous cartoon displayed here as Figure 1.8 This remarkable 
composition gives a concise visual account of what we would nowadays call the "stylized facts" 
of the cycle as they were understood a century and a half ago, and it still has considerable 
resonance for today's situation, not least in making it quite clear that market economies have 
been here many times before.  
 But it has more specific messages for us too. Those regarding the manner in which 
orderly behaviour of a type with which today's mainstream macroeconomists might perhaps be 
comfortable – "improvement" "confidence" and "prosperity" -  evolves into "excitement", 
"convulsion:", and "stagnation" are particularly pertinent.  Note, for example, that "excitement" - 
whose modern synonym is surely "exuberance" - is depicted here not primarily as a feature of 
financial markets, but of the real economy. The monetary system is present in the picture, to be 
sure, represented by "scrip," stocks" and "shares", and a bank that seems to be offering loans at 2 
percent, but at its centre are eager crowds, presumably of would-be investors, gathered outside 
the offices of the "South Pole Warming Company"  over which an exotic flying machine seems 
to be hovering.  It is only when the foolishness of these undertakings has been revealed – how, 
we are not told -  and "convulsion" - "panic" in today's vocabulary – has set in, that the monetary 
system comes to dominate the scene as the premises of the "Royal Bubble Bank" explode.  It is 
surely not far fetched to see parallels in these two panels with the enthusiasms of a few years ago  
                                                          
7 I have discussed the evolution of these ideas in "Rules, discretion and financial crises in classical and neoclassical 
monetary economics" (Laidler 2004, Ch.2) 
8 The cartoon is already well known historians of monetary economics. It appears in Denis O'Brien's edition of 
Overstone's Correspondence (O'Brien, ed. 1971), and I am indebted to O'Brien for suggesting that it is a product of 
the late 1850s. I am also indebted to him and to Daniel Besomi for correspondence about it and related matters.   
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in the US and certain European countries for ambitious housing construction projects and related 
activities that were exotically financed at low interest rates, or with the collapses in the financial 
sector – for example the explosion of Lehman Brothers - that followed the onset of a quickly 
spreading realization, well informed by hindsight,  that all too many of these had been foolishly 
over-ambitious. 
If we bring the economic understanding of the 1850s, as displayed in this cartoon, to bear 
on the market economy's most recent crisis, we should take particular note of its suggestion that 
economic instability is not exclusively a phenomenon of the monetary system, and conclude that 
the label "financial" that is often attached to it nowadays is misleadingly narrow. This old 
cartoon in fact confirms a critical implication of the view expressed above; namely, that because 
in the real world the monetary system performs the tasks that modern equilibrium models assign 
to the "market", the disruption of that system is also a disruption of the real economy. And the 
cartoon's depiction of the "stagnation" that follows "convulsion" re-enforces this message 
further. The sign carried by those unfortunates standing in the shadow of the workhouse does not 
read, as it would in a dynamic general equilibrium model in which the labour market always 
clears, "we are consuming extra leisure while the opportunity cost of doing so is unusually low", 
but simply, as is appropriate to the real world of a disrupted monetary economy, "we have no 
work to do"9 
 
Say's Law, Money and Sticky Prices  
To put the same point less obliquely, today's dynamic general equilibrium models can generate 
variations in the levels of real activity and employment, but by their very nature they must treat 
these as reflecting voluntary behaviour in markets for goods and services that are continuously 
clearing. In this respect they embody an up-to-date and extreme version of what at one time was 
commonly referred to as "Say's law", the proposition that a general glut - excess supply in 
modern terminology - of goods and services is impossible.10 Keynes, of course, argued that 
"Classical economics", citing John Stuart Mill among others as its representative, relied on this 
proposition, and claimed his refutation of it in the case of a monetary, as opposed to a barter 
economy, to be a critical innovation of his General Theory, thus helping to originate today's 
misleading but standard view about the essential continuity of modern equilibrium modeling 
with the economics of Adam Smith and his Classical successors. 
Some of what Mill himself actually wrote about this matter as early as 1828 - though he 
did not publish it until the appearance of Mill (1844) – is therefore worth quoting. 
 
 "There can never, it is said, be a want of buyers for all commodities; because whoever 
offers a commodity for sale, desires to obtain a commodity in exchange for it, and is 
therefore a buyer by the mere fact of being a seller. The sellers and the buyers, for all 
commodities taken together, must, by the metaphysical necessity of the case, be in exact 
equi-poise to each other; and if there be more sellers than buyers of one thing, there must 
be more buyers than sellers for another. 
  This argument is evidently founded on the supposition of a state of barter, and on 
that supposition, is perfectly incontestable. . . . If, however, we suppose that money is 
                                                          
9 The unemployed are, nevertheless, not the most unfortunate agents in the panel – look in the doorway on its left 
10 "Extreme" because 19th century versions of Say's law permitted the existence of excess demands for some goods 
and services being offset by excess supplies of others. When markets continuously clear, even this possibility is 
ruled out.  
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used, these propositions cease to be exactly true . . . . Interchange by means of money is 
as it has often been observed, ultimately nothing but barter. But there is this difference – 
that in the case of barter, the selling and the buying are yet simultaneously confounded in 
one operation . . .  the effect of the employment of money, and even the utility of it, is, 
that it enables this one act of interchange to be divided into two separate acts or 
operations.  . . .when there is a general anxiety to sell, and a general disinclination to buy, 
commodities of all kinds remain for a long time unsold, and those which find an 
immediate market, do so at a very low price.. . . But those who have, at periods such as 
we have described, affirmed that there was an excess of all commodities, never pretended 
that money was one of those commodities; they held that there was not an excess but a 
deficiency of the circulating medium. What they called a general super-abundance, was 
not a super-abundance of commodities relative to commodities, but a super- abundance 
of all commodities relatively to money" (Mill 1844, pp. 69-71) 
 
Now "a general anxiety to sell" is a central characteristic of what our anonymous 
cartoonist called "convulsion", and Mill was here exploring the economy's transition from this 
state to one of "stagnation". But he did not complete this task, either in (1844) or in the parallel 
passages dealing with the cycle in his (1848) Principles. In (1879), however, Alfred and Mary 
Paley Marshall paraphrased Mill's by then quite standard account, noted that "the connexion 
(sic!) between a fall of prices and a suspension of industry remains to be worked out" (Marshall 
and Marshall 1879, p. 155), and proceeded to fill in this gap by examining the consequences of 
the fact that ". . . when prices are falling, the fall in the price of a finished commodity is 
generally more rapid than that in the price of the raw material, always more rapid than that in 
the price of labour " (p. 156, italics added).  Thereafter, and for more than half a century before 
the publication of the General Theory, nominal wage stickiness was the standard "Classical" 
explanation of unemployment in a monetary economy, and today's practice of making it the 
defining postulate of "New-Keynesian" macroeconomics is simply another symptom of how 
badly our discipline's history is misunderstood by its practitioners.11 
 
Keynes on the Irrelevance of Price Stickiness 
Keynes himself explicitly argued that money wage stickiness, though a useful simplifying 
assumption for expounding his own theory of how Say's law might fail was in no way essential 
to it. Though his claim to have moved beyond his predecessors simply by dissenting from that 
law is not credible, his attribution of its failure in a monetary economy the fact that the rate of 
interest's role in equilibrating the supply and demand for money interfered with its ability to 
maintain equilibrium between saving and investment when the latter declined suddenly as the 
                                                          
11 I discussed the evolution of ideas about wage and price stickiness in my 1991 Henry Thornton Lecture "Wage 
and price stickiness in macroeconomics: an historical perspective" (Laidler 2004, Ch.12) Wage stickiness had made 
a brief appearance in Henry Thornton's (1802) Paper Credit but only found a central place in the mainstream 
literature after the Marshalls' deployment of it. Their analysis, and that of their immediate successors, not least 
Pigou (e.g.1913), went on to emphasize the effects on real wages and hence on the demand for labour of 
interactions between sticky wages and more flexible prices, thus deploying a not quite satisfactory application of 
partial equilibrium labour market analysis to the economy as a whole to explain the emergence of unemployment. In 
(1913), however, Ralph Hawtrey began to argue that the real significance of wage stickiness arose because, by way 
of mark-up mechanisms, it created stickiness in money prices too, thus inhibiting the price level adjustments needed 
to eliminate the excess demand for money and associated excess supplies of output and labour that developed 
during the transition from "convulsion" to "stagnation".    
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"animal spirits" of businessmen collapsed, was both novel and important. So was his explanation 
of "stagnation" characterized by low output and employment as the outcome of an alternative 
equilibrating mechanism that operated through the celebrated multiplier process.12  
Keynes did, to be sure, concede that the forces leading to and sustaining stagnation could 
in principle be counteracted by lower levels of money wages and hence prices, but he was 
extremely skeptical about the practical significance of these mechanisms. To begin with, the 
route whereby they had to work was indirect. It ran through money wage adjustments in labour 
markets to price adjustments in output markets, and thence to the supply and demand for money, 
in order finally to relieve pressures in another market altogether, that in which savings and 
investment decisions were linked by the interest rate. Second, and more important, though 
downward wage and price flexibility was required for these indirect mechanisms to work at all, 
the fact of falling wages and prices was likely to have effects on the dynamics of the adjustment 
process, particularly by way of extrapolative deflationary expectations, that might make the 
attainment of equilibrium impossible. Hence Keynes's conclusion that wage flexibility could and 
should not be counted on either to prevent real stagnation emerging in a monetary economy, or 
of relieving it once it had .become established. Provided it is understood that by such flexibility, 
Keynes meant wages and therefore prices which move quickly when markets are out of 
equilibrium, and not wages and prices that always move quickly enough to keep them in 
equilibrium in the first place, his argument about its essential irrelevance must be taken 
seriously, not as a general proposition about how a monetary economy always functions, but as a 
warning about the risks of malfunction to which it is vulnerable when trading can take place at 
out-of-equilibrium prices, flexible or not.13  
It was the later work of such as Patinkin (1957) Clower (1965) and Leijonhufvud (1968) 
on the links between old-Keynesian and Walrasian economics, that brought into monetary 
economics two already established ideas from microeconomic theory.  First, that when the 
market economy's equilibrium is disturbed by a shock of some sort, a return to equilibrium can 
only be guaranteed if no production or trading are undertaken before prices have attained their 
new array of market clearing values, that there is no trading at "false" prices;  and second, that 
such an outcome requires the economy to operate "as if" an agent specially appointed to oversee 
the price formation process -  a so-called Walrasian auctioneer - prevents any such trading or, 
equivalently, works so fast to change prices that they never deviate from their market clearing 
values in the first place.  
                                                          
12  Though Keynes did not pay much attention to the cycle as such in the General Theory, it does no violence to his 
analysis if we attribute to him the belief that the economy's transition from "excitement" through "panic" to 
"stagnation" was largely driven by a collapse of animal spirits rather than by the monetary contraction which 
Marshall, Fisher, Hawtrey et. al. emphasized, 
13 The importance of distinguishing between these two senses of "flexibility", and the relatively recent appearance 
of the second of them in macroeconomics, is explored at some length in Laidler (2004, Ch. 12). It is because of its 
reliance on assumptions of wage and price rigidity that I do not at this point pay attention to the formal analysis of 
the properties of non-clearing markets, surveyed, for example by Benassy (1993)     
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Walras on the Empirical Relevance of General Equilibrium 
This famous entity did not figure in any of Leon Walras' own accounts of these matters.14 Rather 
he envisaged equilibrium prices being discovered by way of a tatonnement process that involved 
a price in terms a common unit of account – the system's so called numeraire - being cried out 
for  
 
 ". . . each type of land and labour service, and product.. If at that price the quantity 
effectively demanded exceeds the quantity effectively supplied, entrepreneurs will bid 
that price up. If the quantity effectively supplied exceeds the quantity effectively 
demanded, landlords, workers and capitalists will reduce their asking prices. The ruling 
price is the one at which effective demand and supply are equal." (Walras, 1886, p. 26, 
my translation) 
 
And in Walras' own accounts of how markets work, goods and services are exchanged, not "as 
if" by multilateral barter, but by exactly the same system of bilateral monetary exchanges as 
envisaged by Adam Smith and Mill, in which the item serving as the system's numeraire is also 
its means of exchange. Walras was aware that trading at false prices could cause problems (more 
so when he dealt with a production than a pure exchange economy however) though his efforts 
to deal with these were not quite satisfactory, even from a purely theoretical standpoint. More 
important, however, from the point of view of the history of monetary economics, Walras 
himself never claimed that the equilibrium characteristics of his theoretical system should be 
interpreted as mimicking the observable behaviour of any real world economy in the way that 
today's exponents of dynamic general equilibrium modeling do.15 On the contrary, 
 
 ". . .the market is like a lake agitated by the wind, where the water is incessantly seeking 
its level without ever reaching it. But whereas there are days where the surface of the 
lake is almost smooth, there never are days when effective demand for products and 
services equals there effective supply and when the selling price of products equals the 
cost of the productive services used in making them. The diversion of productive services 
from the enterprises that are losing money to profitable enterprises takes place in various 
ways, the most important being through credit operations, but at best these ways are 
slow. It can happen and frequently does happen in the real world, that under some 
circumstances the selling price will remain for long periods of time above the cost of 
production and continue to rise in spite of increase in output, while under other 
circumstances a fall in price, following upon this rise, will suddenly bring the selling 
price below cost of production and force the entrepreneurs to reverse their production 
policies. For just as a lake is, at times, stirred to its very depths by a storm, so also the 
market is sometimes thrown into violent confusion by crises, which are sudden and 
general disturbances of equilibrium." (Walras, 1874-81, tr. 1956, p. 380)) 
                                                          
14 On Walras' treatment of these matters, see in particular, Patinkin (1957), Note B, "Walras' Theory of 
Tatonnement" and Note C "Walras' Theory of Money". It should also be noted that Joseph Ascheim and George 
Tavlas (e.g. 1991) have stressed the importance of money's unit of account role in the price setting process in the 
development of Classical monetary doctrines. 
15 It is worth noting that the following analogy with the surface of a lake, taken from the Elements, is also deployed 
in Walras' Theorie de la Monnaie. Such repetition suggests that he thought the point he was making to be important. 
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As we noted earlier, macroeconomic models based on the postulate of continuously 
clearing markets cannot address the kind of instability envisaged here by Walras, which has not 
only characterised the last few years, but which seems to have been a rather regular feature of 
economic life in market economies from their very beginnings. And we have now seen that these 
difficulties stem from a fact that was understood with ever increasing clarity from the very 
beginnings of economics until about thirty years ago, when its significance began to be 
neglected, namely that what we call market economies are really monetary economies, and differ 
in essential ways from systems which function "as if" presided over by an auctioneer. And 
specifically, as we also learned along the way, it is not that the monetary economy is subject to 
wage and/or price stickiness that matters, even though it might be, but that its workings permit 
decisions about quantities to be made and implemented in response to "false" wages and prices 
and that these decisions can sometimes have destabilizing consequences.16  
 
Explaining Stability and Instability 
This conclusion can all too easily explain too much. If trading at false prices can create unstable 
quantity dynamics, and if it is likely to occur in a monetary economy, then why are such systems 
not in a perpetual state of disarray?  How can we explain episodes such as the "Great 
Moderation"?  The answer here perhaps lies in another feature of the monetary economy, namely 
that its operations give rise to demand for inventories of the economy's means of exchange, and 
close substitutes for them, on the part of individual agents, an idea first explicitly developed by 
two economists who have already played a prominent role in the foregoing discussion, namely 
Marshall and Walras.  
 
Monetary Buffers and the Corridor of Stability 
Marshall, in an unpublished manuscript of 1871 or thereabouts, put matters as follows: 
 
 "If any man keeps accounts accurately by subtracting his payments up to any day from 
his receipts up to that day we know the cash he has on hand at the beginning of that day. 
Add up these sums for each day, divide by the number of days, and we have the amount 
of cash he has each day on average" (Marshall 1871, [1975], Vol. 1, p. 175),  
 
And it is this average amount about whose determination he then proceeded to theorize, a 
quantity that that we have long since learned to call the individual agent's "demand for money". 
A key point here is that the agent's actual holdings of money on any of Marshall's days can differ 
from that same agent's demand for money because those holdings serve as a "buffer stock" that 
stands between irregularities in the pattern of payments and receipts, and they derive their 
usefulness from insulating plans that have been made about one of these from unexpected 
fluctuations in the other.17 This is where the "convenience" of holding money comes from, and it 
explains both why the target value that agents set for their average balances varies in proportion 
to the average price level at which transactions are to be executed – a point of which Marshall 
made much, as did Walras in his own later (1886) but independent account of these issues - and 
                                                          
16 Calvo contracts can, after all be introduced into equilibrium systems and their markets continue to clear subject to 
the constraints they impose. That is what the New-Keynesian variant of dynamic general equilibrium modeling 
relies on. 
17 I have discussed money's buffer stock role, and its implications elsewhere. See for example, Laidler (1988) where 
references to my earlier treatments of these issues are also given. 
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also moves up and down with some measure of the real scale on which those transactions are 
carried out.  
Money's buffer-stock role has potentially important consequences for the nature of the 
monetary economy. When an agent encounters a quantity surprise as a result of trying to trade at 
what turns out to have been a non-market clearing price in one market, provided that shock is not 
"too large", his inventory of cash balances can absorb it and costly changes in behaviour in other 
markets are not immediately forced upon him. Agents who hold buffer stocks of money thus face 
reduced incentives to gather costly information that might help them to reduce their error-
proneness, and as a result, their behaviour is likely to reflect expectations based on less than all 
the information that is available in the market place and on less than a full understanding of the 
"true model" that characterizes the economy's properties. At the same time, the capacity of 
fluctuations in monetary buffers to absorb the consequences of trading at false prices gives the 
aggregates economy a degree of insulation against the dynamic instability that such trading can 
generate. Furthermore, in a modern economy, the opportunities for agents to provide themselves 
with monetary buffers go far beyond holding inventories of the means of exchange. Any asset 
which can be rapidly and reliably converted into cash at low cost can also play this role. 
Despite the proclivity of agents in a monetary economy to make errors, and to trade at 
false prices, then, so long as the shocks that impinge on them are not "too large", the existence 
monetary buffers will permit the economy to remain in what Leijonhufvud (1973) and Peter 
Howitt (1978) call a "corridor of stability" and perhaps to behave very much as predicted by a 
dynamic general equilibrium model. Considerations such as these help reconcile the monetary 
economy's capacity for generating instability with episodes like the "Great Moderation". But 
they leave open the possibility that from time to time, shocks that are "too large" might hit "too 
many" agents and markets at once, and set up dynamics that drive the real economy out of its 
stable corridor towards "stagnation". Possibilities that come to mind here include sudden falls in 
the economy-wide supply of money that provoke attempts by a significant number of agents to 
restore their individual buffer-stocks by selling other assets, and/or altering their planned 
patterns of buying and selling real goods and services, widespread shocks to confidence – such 
as Mill postulated in 1828 - that provoke similar behaviour as agents try to increase the size of 
their monetary buffers, and of course, in today's economy, malfunctions in the markets for some 
of the non-money assets that had seemed to be reliable buffers in their own right that suddenly 
reduce their perceived marketability. 
All of these conjectures might help explain how a monetary economy can progress from 
"convulsion" to "stagnation", but they nevertheless start in the middle of the story. Recent events 
also require us to explain also how the movements from "prosperity" to "excitement" that 
precipitate "convulsion" develop, and here the history of monetary economics is almost too 
helpful in the number and variety of possible answers it offers. However, there are certain 
recurrent facts about the onset of crises that not every theory deals with adequately, and we can 
use these to narrow down the field. 
 
Monetarist and Old-Keynesian Explanations of the Onset of Crises  
It is well known that upswings during which the transition from "prosperity" to "excitement" 
occurs are usually marked by a noticeable increase in the rate of price inflation. So-called 
"Monetarist" explanations of this transition pay particular attention to this fact, and since Alfred 
Marshall (1887) and Irving Fisher (1911) have explained it in terms of the failure of nominal 
interest rates to adjust fast enough as inflation gets under way to prevent real interest rates from 
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falling.18 This effect in turn puts upward pressure on credit and money growth and therefore, as 
agents respond to a perpetual tendency of money to be in excess supply, on expenditure as well. 
Inflation then rises further, and so on, in an ongoing spiral. In this story, crises and recessions 
ensue in due course, either, in its older versions, because the banking system finds its reserves 
under pressure and belatedly increases nominal interest rates or, in modern versions because 
monetary slowdowns intended to bring inflation under control are engineered by policy makers. 
There is much to be said for this explanation of the development of "excitement" and its 
subsequent unwinding into "convulsion", and it seems to account well for many episodes of 
instability since the Second World War – not least those that accompanied the great inflation that 
preceded the stabilization efforts of that well known composite politician "Ronald Thatcher". But 
there have been episodes and facts that it does not deal with. First, and most obviously, some 
striking episodes of "excitement", "convulsion" and subsequent "stagnation" were not preceded 
by noticeable increases in the rate of price inflation. The United States experienced a stable and 
even slightly falling price level before the October 1929 stock-market crash that heralded the 
onset of the Great Depression; Japan's "lost decade" was preceded by only a slow rise in inflation 
that barely reached a 3 per cent peak in 1992,  a year after the stock market bubble had burst; and 
prior to the summer of 2007, though US inflation did exceed 4 per cent for a while, and with 
hindsight perhaps ought to have triggered a little concern, the price level's overall behaviour 
gave no forewarning of the scale of problems that were to follow. Troubling also is the fact that, 
while the Monetarist story does not explicitly rule out the frequent tendency for "excitement" to 
be accompanied by over-optimistic investment projects – that "South Pole Warming Company" 
of our cartoon, or, more recently, all of those now semi-derelict condominium developments in 
Florida and elsewhere - it does not specifically account for them either. 
"Old-Keynesian" economics does better with these two specific issues. It locates the 
origins of economic fluctuations not in the behaviour of money, but in swings in the "animal 
spirits" of investors, an essentially irrational psychological factor that is said to underlie 
successive waves of over-optimism and excessive pessimism on their part, and in an 
accompanying chronic tendency for short-term "speculation" to dominate long-term "enterprise" 
– these are Keynes's (1936) terms -  in the financial markets in which investment funds are 
raised. This approach permits "excitement" to be accompanied by price inflation, but does not 
require this, and it treats over-enthusiastic capital accumulation as its key feature. Even so, and 
the lasting importance of Keynes's contribution to out understanding of "stagnation" as a product 
of the monetary economy notwithstanding, this analysis of "excitement" seems better adapted to 
rationalizing its characteristics ex post than at explaining them ex ante, as I have argued at 
greater length in Laidler (2010).19 This "old-Keynesian" way of dealing with the facts of 
instability in the monetary economy that the Monetarist alternative neglects might, of course, 
                                                          
18 I adopt the adjective "monetarist" here because the so-called Fisher effect (which was actually discussed by 
Marshall, before Fisher took it up) is central to the work of Friedman and Schwartz (e.g. 1963) and Allan Meltzer 
(e.g. 2003) on this topic, but this line of argument has gone through many more variations and elaborations over the 
years than can be discussed here. There is no consensus this approach's exponents, for example about what kind of 
shocks might set "improvement" and "confidence" in motion in the first place, with some of them – e.g. Hawtrey 
(1913) - even treating the cycle as a self-perpetuating phenomenon.   
19 And it also leads rather too quickly for comfort to proposals for "the introduction of a substantial Government 
transfer tax on all transactions" (Keynes 1936, p. 160) in financial markets, in order to redress the balance between 
"speculation" and "enterprise" in their workings, as well as for "the socialization of investment" as a further means 
of stabilizing overall expenditure in the economy. 
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turn out to be the best available, and given what we have said above about the incentives 
inherent in a monetary economy for agents to act on the basis of less than fully rational 
expectations, we cannot quite rule this out. But there remain other possibilities worth 
considering. 
 
Hayek on Forced Saving in the Monetary Economy   
In the early 1930s, Keynes's most prominent critic was Friedrich von Hayek, but though 
antagonists over most issues, these two were always in complete agreement about the overall 
theme of this lecture: namely, that economic instability must be understood as a property specific 
to the monetary economy. Unlike his later self, the Hayek of this period was a devotee of and a 
notable contributor to static Walras-inspired general equilibrium theory, then so popular among 
non-Marxist continental European economists.20 However, in his view  
 
 Trade Cycle theory cannot aim at the adaptation of the adjusting mechanism of static 
theory to a special case; this scheme of explanation must itself be extended so as to 
explain how. . .discrepancies between supply and demand can . . . arise. The obvious, and 
(to my mind) the only possible way . . . is to explain the difference between the course of 
events described by static theory . . . and the actual course of events, by the fact that, with 
the introduction of money (or strictly speaking with the introduction of indirect 
exchange), a new determining cause is introduced." (Hayek, 1933. p. 44) 
 
Even so, he was critical of earlier theories of the trade cycle in what we would now call the 
Monetarist tradition.21  
 
 Monetary theories of the Trade Cycle succeeded in giving prominence to the right 
questions and, in many cases, made important contributions towards their solution; but 
the reason why an unassailable solution has not yet been put forward seems to reside in 
the fact that all the adherents of the monetary theory of the Trade Cycle have sought an 
explanation either exclusively or predominantly in the superficial phenomena of changes 
in the value of money, while failing to pursue the far more profound and fundamental 
effects of the process by which money is introduced into the economic system, as distinct 
from its effects on prices in general. Nor did they follow up the consequences of the 
fundamental diversity between a money economy and the pure barter economy which is 
assumed in static theory." (Hayek, 1933, pp. 44-45)  
 
The "fundamental diversity" to which Hayek here refers is the fact, of which much has 
already been made above, that exchange in a monetary economy takes place through a series of 
bilateral trades mediated by money, while the process by which money is introduced into the 
                                                          
20 The common Walrasian starting point of the  cycle theories of Hayek and Lucas prompted me to flirt for a while 
with the label "neo-Austrian" as an alternative to "New-classical" for the latter. See for example, my essay on "The 
Austrians and the Stockholm School: two failures in the development of modern macroeconomics?" (Laidler 2004, 
Ch. 9) This was misleading, as Axel Leijonhufvud quickly convinced me, by pointing out in his (1991) comment on 
this paper that at least the Austrians understood that things could go badly wrong in an economy that had 
nevertheless started out in equilibrium.   
21 Including Keynes's own contribution to this line of work, the Treatise on Money (1930). See his two part (Hayek 
193 1-1932) review of that work.   
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system to whose effects he calls attention arises from its being the liability of a banking system, 
whose activities in credit markets lead to the creation of money as their by-product. Hayek 
started from the essentially Wicksellian (.e.g. 1898) proposition that, so long as the banking 
system maintained the rate of interest at a value at which the plans of households for the time 
path of consumption matched those of firm for the time path of production, the monetary 
economy would operate "as if" it were an equilibrium system, but that if the banking system set 
the wrong "market" rate, and in particular set it too low, then things would begin to go amiss. 
 
Forced Saving as Trading at a False Price 
Specifically, the emergence of a particular example of a false price, namely "too low" a market 
rate of interest, would misleadingly signal to investors that households had decided to shift their 
pattern of consumption over time away from the present and towards the future, while the 
willingness of banks to make loans at this rate would simultaneously allow them to acquire 
money with which to bid successfully against households for the resources required to set new 
and apparently profitable projects in motion. Households would thus be "forced" to relinquish 
these resources, and hence to "save", even though they had formed no inclination to buy the 
goods that the new investment projects, once completed, would produce.22  
The money thus injected into circulation might, to be sure, also have effects on the price 
level, as standard monetary theories predicted, but these were of secondary importance compared 
to the real mismatches developing between households' plans for future consumption, and firms' 
plans to satisfy them. These disequilibria would continue to grow so long as the market rate of 
interest remained "too low", and the longer it did so, the greater would be the eventual 
dislocation of the real economy when the resulting investments were finally revealed to have 
been unprofitable mistakes, and the more violent also the associated instability in the financial 
system that had financed them as borrowers found themselves unable to meet their obligations.. 
It is hard to see how such mistakes on the part of individuals with their consequent dislocations 
of market mechanisms could persist long enough to do much harm in a world where plans are 
based on fully informed rational expectations, of course, but as we have already argued, such 
expectations are unlikely to characterize a monetary economy. 
The phenomenon of "forced saving" had been recognized from time to time for more than 
a century before Hayek and his fellow Austrians made it the centre-piece of a theory which, in 
the early 1930s looked for a while as if it would sweep the field as an explanation of economic 
instability.23 This incipient "Austrian" revolution eventually failed in the face of competition 
from the "old-Keynesian" alternative, but its eclipse was in some respects regrettable. Though it 
did not offer any satisfactory account of why chronic unemployment was a feature of 
"stagnation", and, crucial to its success, that old-Keynesian rival did, what Roger Garrison 
(2001) later called Hayek's "theory of the inflationary boom", based on forced saving, provided a 
perhaps more attractive explanation of the emergence of "excitement" and "convulsion", 
                                                          
22 For the sake of brevity, the description of "forced saving" given here is, to say the least, basic, and does not do 
full justice to the subtlety of Hayek's own treatment of the idea in Prices and Production (1931). Note also, that 
Hayek (1933), the work cited here, is in fact an English translation of a German monograph whose first version 
appeared in 1928, before Hayek had fully developed his analysis of the cycle.    
23 Its first appearance in print seems to have been due to Henry Thornton (1802). Hayek (1932) is still the best 
account of the idea's history. Note that the essentials of what came to be called the Austrian theory of the cycle were 
developed by Ludwig von Mises as early as (1912), and he in turn was dealing with problems posed by Wicksell's 
(1898) seminal book, Interest and Prices 
 18
inasmuch as its pivotal mechanism relied not on irrational swings in animal spirits, but rather to 
a dislocation in the allocation of resources over time created by the responses of rational agents 
to inappropriate information and incentives conveyed to them by a falsely low value for the rate 
of interest. 
The interest rate's tendency to settle at false values from time to time in a money 
economy also needs to be explained, of course, and Austrians have often attributed this to the 
proclivity of state-run central banks to indulge in inflationary low-interest rate policies – it is no 
accident that the later Hayek would propose The Denationalization of Money (1976) - and in 
many times and places such an explanation has fitted only too well. But it doesn't fit the facts 
everywhere - those generated by the typical 19th century cycle for example, either in the Britain 
with which our cartoonist was familiar, where the central bank was privately owned, or the 
United States which didn't even acquire a central bank until 1913 – and in any event, a shortfall 
of the rate of interest from its market-clearing value can emerge in many other ways24. For 
example, Keynes's sometime student, collaborator and eventual critic, Dennis Robertson (1926) 
noted both the ubiquity of technical innovations and their capacity to raise real rates of return in 
the industries where they occurred, and stressed that it was the role of a well functioning banking 
system to reallocate the current flow of households' savings towards these, with what he termed 
"appropriate" fluctuations in output and prices being likely to accompany the process. But he 
also suggested that bank lending to expanding sectors where rates of return were unusually high 
could all too easily be overdone, leading to excessive investment financed by forced saving, and 
super-imposing "inappropriate" fluctuations in output and prices upon the "appropriate" ones25. 
There is, in any event,  no reason to insist on the same cause for every instance of the 
emergence of a too low market interest rate that then gives rise to forced saving. For example, 
the recent crisis seems to have been preceded, not by innovations in production driven by 
technical change, but by innovations in the financial sector that distorted the links between 
policy interest rates and those faced by certain classes of borrowers. The key point is that the 
process of forced saving, whatever sets it going, has many attractions as an explanation of those 
transitions from "prosperity" to "excitement" and thence to "convulsion" that precede 
"stagnation". 
To begin with, forced saving provides a particular instance of the trading at false prices 
that is endemic to the monetary economy, the false prices in question in this instance being the 
rates of interest ruling in the market where the allocation of resources over time is coordinated, 
the very same market in which Keynes located the roots of "stagnation". Furthermore forced 
saving works exactly on that margin between the monetary system and the real economy to 
which our cartoonist drew attention in the late 1850s when he depicted "excitement", and it also 
                                                          
24 This is not to say that the 19th century Bank of England did not sometimes set its discount rate at too low, and 
hence inflationary, levels, because it did. However, the causes here had more to do with a deficient understanding of 
the mechanisms of monetary policy on the part of its directors than with any conscious desire to maximize 
seigniorage on behalf of government. 
25  In (1915) Robertson had approached the explanation of Industrial Fluctuation from the point of view of what is 
often called the Marx-Schumpeter tradition in business cycle theory, stressing the uneven pace of technical change 
as itself being the cycle's source. In the 1920s, with Keynes's encouragement, he began to integrate monetary factors 
into his analysis, without giving up his appreciation of the importance of technical change. He thus has a strong 
claim, as Charles Goodhart (1992) pointed out, to be viewed as an early exponent of what is now termed "real 
business cycle theory". However, unlike modern exponents of that theory, he did not confine his analysis to states 
of equilibrium.  
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explains the tendencies of crises both to leave unwanted capital in their wake as well as to create 
associated problems for the financial institutions which financed its creation. Finally, it explains 
why crises are usually but not always heralded by bouts of general price inflation. To adopt 
today's terminology, forced saving is a consequence of the unanticipated creation of credit by 
financial institutions and within limits, as both the Austrians and Robertson knew, it can take 
place without inflation because, though credit creation entails the creation of money as a by-
product, a growing economy can absorb a certain amount of monetary expansion without 
inflationary pressures. It is striking that this is what Robertson, writing in (1928, pp. 91-92), 
thought was happening in the United States just before the Depression, where a boom was 
clearly in progress but the price level was not rising. Similar arguments can, perhaps be made 
about Japan in the late 1980s and the United States more recently. 
 
Monetary Policy for the Monetary Economy 
If being aware of the fact that the market economy is really a monetary economy helps us to 
understand economic crises such as the one we have recently seen, it should surely also help us 
in designing policies to make the occurrence of such events less likely in the future, and to cope 
with their consequences when they nevertheless occur. So it surely does, but it would take 
another paper at least as long as this one to develop the relevant analysis in any depth, so perhaps 
I may be permitted to be brief, and to rely once again, as I have throughout this paper, on the 
wisdom of some earlier contributors to monetary economics. 
 
Controlling Money and Credit Growth 
If what we might term the Hayek-Robertson account of the transition from "prosperity" to 
"excitement" to "convulsion" is valid, then control over the growth rates of money and credit is 
crucial to reducing the chances of such processes getting out of hand. Since such control is also 
basic to the maintenance of low and stable inflation – notwithstanding the absence of this factor 
from those equilibrium models in terms of which inflation-targeting monetary policy has been 
routinely discusses in recent years - there is no fundamental conflict between the pursuit of low 
inflation and the maintenance of asset market stability, and, with suitable institutional 
adaptations, there is as much wisdom and relevance today as there ever was in  Henry Thornton's 
(1802) advice to the Bank of England  
 
 To limit the total amount of paper issued, and to resort for this purpose, whenever the 
temptation to borrow is strong, to some effectual principles of restriction; in no case, 
however, materially to diminish the circulation, but to let it vibrate only within certain 
limits; to afford a slow and cautious extension of it as the general trade of the kingdom 
enlarges itself; to allow of some special, though temporary encrease in the event of any 
extra-ordinary alarm or difficulty as the best means of preventing a great demand at home 
for guineas and [advice relevant for today's economies only where there is reason to fear 
floating] to lean to the side of diminution, in the case of gold going abroad, and the 
general exchange continuing long unfavourable"  (p.259) 
 
Perhaps the "Great Moderation" had something to do with the fact that, for a while, many 
central banks were implicitly heeding this advice as they pursued their inflation targets. We 
should nevertheless be mindful that the Great Moderation did come to an end without serious 
increases in inflation preceding its collapse, and also that Thornton had in any event never 
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offered a guarantee that stable monetary expansion would always be enough to avoid trouble: he 
was well aware that "some extraordinary alarm or difficulty" could always strike. We should not 
therefore expect even successful inflation control policies to guarantee asset market stability in 
all circumstances. Historical experience, not to mention the economic analysis discussed in this 
lecture suggests no more than that that they will help. 
 
The Difficulty of Getting it Right 
Here we should also recall Dennis Robertson's admonition that  "The aim of monetary policy 
should surely not be to prevent all fluctuations in the general price-level, but to permit those that 
are necessary to the establishment of appropriate alterations in output and to repress those which 
tend to carry the alterations in output beyond the appropriate point"  (1926, p. 39). But we should 
also note his warnings about the extreme difficulty of getting this balance right, and his views 
about the implications of this difficulty for the side on which policy should then err. 
 
 "I do not feel confident that a policy which, in the pursuit of stability of prices, output 
and employment had nipped in the bud the British railway boom of the forties, or the 
American railway boom of 1869-71, or the German electrical boom of the nineties, 
would have been on the balance beneficial to the populations concerned (1926, p. 22) 
 
In short, not only should we not rely on the traditional tools of monetary policy to 
guarantee asset market stability under all circumstances, but we should not work so hard at 
trying to make them do so that we jeopardize other goals. Asset markets exist, after all, to 
reallocate capital towards newly productive sectors of the economy and away from those that are 
flagging, and troubles with their workings all too often originate in the very relative price 
movements that are essential to this process, to whose control the traditional tools of monetary 
policy are in any event badly adapted. This is where regulation might help, if of course we knew 
how to get that right, a matter that must be discussed on some other occasion. In the meanwhile, 
it would be wise for today's central banks to remain always prepared to follow Thornton's advice 
about supplying the modern equivalent of guineas to meet the sudden demands for liquidity that 
accompany "convulsion" and of which Mill made so much, and to act as lenders of last resort. 
And if such measures fail to prevent the onset of stagnation, then, as I have already argued in this 
lecture, the great strength of old-Keynesian economics lies in what it has to say about this state 
of affairs. My own preference on the policy front here would be to follow the Keynes of the 
Tract on Monetary Reform and the Treatise of Money, rather than of The General Theory, not to 
mention among others, Milton Friedman (e.g. Friedman and Schwartz 1963), whom Lucas 
(2004) correctly identified as being intellectually closer to Keynes than to modern dynamic 
general equilibrium modelers, and to put more weight on monetary than fiscal remedies, but like 
financial system regulation, this too is a topic for another time. 
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A Final Word  
To the objection that the application of old-Keynesian policies to an economy that has passed 
through "convulsion" into "stagnation" amounts to prolonging the measures that in the first place 
created the "excitement" that led up to it all, Lionel Robbins (1971) recantation of his (1934) 
deployment of this same, very Austrian, objection may be offered in rebuttal 
 
 "Assuming that the original diagnosis of excessive financial ease and mistaken real 
investment was correct . . .  to treat what developed subsequently in the way which I then 
[1934] thought valid was an unsuitable as denying blankets and stimulus to a drunk who 
has fallen into an icy pond on the ground that his original problem was overheating"  
(p.154)  
 
Or to put matters in the language deployed in this lecture, although "excitement", "convulsion" 
and "stagnation" are all manifestations of the damaging effects on the monetary economy of the 
trading at false prices that equilibrium modeling assumes to be impossible, the false nature of the 
prices in question changes as the economy moves through these states, their effects on real 
activity therefore change, and those effects require changing remedies. 
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